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Introduction 
Every time a new multiannual financial framework (MFF) is negotiated, there is a call for the EU to 
invest in new policies that provide added-value. What would this mean? Firstly, that EU investment 
is cost effective and that it is cheaper to run a single EU expenditure policy even in a policy such as 
agriculture than as 27 or 28 different national expenditure polices. Secondly, that there are cross-
border benefits, efficiently linking areas of opportunity between the Member States. Erasmus+, 
Horizon 2020, or the Connecting Europe Framework are examples of this. Thirdly, it is the ability to 
afford expensive investment in the collective good that any one Member State alone would not be 
able to afford. Examples include Galileo and the nuclear fusion ITER programme. 
These three types of added-value are the basis for the case of reform of the budget. They always face 
challenges from the Member States concerned either to maximise their economic benefit, or to 
minimise the cost for their Treasuries. Others simply call for a lower budget, even if most of them 
recognise the collective benefits of added-value. Moreover, some Member States in the face of 
expenditure reductions, move to salvage their benefits in agricultural or cohesion expenditure. The 
predictable results in negotiating the MFFs in 2006 and 2013 were somewhat smaller budgets. These 
contained less of an increase in added-value expenditure than originally proposed, and smaller 
reductions than anticipated for agricultural and cohesion expenditure, against a backdrop of net 
balance or juste retour calculations by Member States. The question is how to break this logjam. 
In 2013, the Parliament accepted a package deal of expenditure reductions in exchange for significantly 
more flexibility in the budget, a full scale review of the MFF in 2016-17 and the establishment of a High 
Level Group on Own Resources to investigate new sources of finance for the budget (Benedetto 2019). 
The flexibility and the mid-term review may have allowed for a larger real terms budget to have taken 
effect despite the reduction in commitments and payments in the official figures.  
In turn, the paper will focus on the European Commission’s proposal of 2018 for the new MFF, the 
challenge of net balances, funds and instruments outside the EU budget, and possible packages for 
reform. 
The Commission's proposal of May 2018 
In May 2018, the Commission made its proposals for the post-2020 MFF, the first to take account of 
Brexit and the loss of the British contribution. To retain expenditure at current levels, given the 
departure of the United Kingdom, commitments in the budget would need to be set at 1.16% of 
gross national income (GNI) (Parry and Sapala 2018). 
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Instead, the Commission proposed a figure at 1.11% implying a repetition of a cut close to the 
reductions that had occurred in 2013 and in 2006.1 Part of the “cost” of the British withdrawal was 
indeed met by the Commission in proposing some limited areas of new financing of the budget but 
not by an amount sufficient to retain the balance at 1.16% of GNI.  
In terms of planned expenditure, more was proposed for areas of added-value, what used to be 
Heading 1a, and less for cohesion and for agriculture, as had also occurred for the negotiations of 
2006 and 2013. Strategic investment includes Connecting Europe and the Digital Europe 
Programme, whereas People and Values include the European Social Fund (investing in 
employability and previously part of cohesion) and Erasmus+. There were also some new priorities 
in response to the refugee and migration crises. See Table A. 
Table A: The MFF proposal for 2021-2027 by policy cluster 
Policy Cluster €mn % share 
% change 
from last MFF   
1. Research & Innovation 91028 8.2 +30   
2. Strategic Investment 44375 4.0 +39   
3. Single Market 5672 0.5 +11   
4. Space 14404 1.3 +25   
5. Cohesion 242209 21.8 -11   
6. EMU 22281 2.0 New   
7. People and Values 123466 11.1 +7   
8. Agriculture and Maritime 330724 29.7 -15   
9. Environment and Climate 5085 0.5 +46   
10. Migration 9972 0.9 +39   
11. Border Management 18824 1.7 +243   
12. Security 4255 0.4 +23   
13. Defence 17220 1.5 New   
14. Crisis Response 1242 0.1 +122   
15. External Action 93150 8.4 +9   
16. Pre-accession assistance 12865 1.2 -1   
Administration 75602 6.8 +7   
Commitments 1134583   +5   
GNI%       1.11 
Payments 1104805       
GNI%       1.08 
Source: Parry and Sapala (2018: 21-24) 
The challenge of net balances  
The pervasiveness of net balance considerations prevents the budget from responding with agility 
to new challenges in domains such as migration, the climate crisis, energy security, regional stability 
in Europe’s neighbourhood. Appealing to the collective interest is ineffective against the pressure 
faced by Council members to deliver benefits to domestic audiences, so a new approach is needed. 
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Heinemann et al. (2010) and Osterloh et al. (2009) propose to solve the net balance approach 
through a mechanism that makes the approach explicit and accountable: a generalised correction 
mechanism that reforms and reinforces net balances. According to income per capita, each 
country’s budgetary balance would be pre-established. Regardless of this, expenditure would take 
effect, after which rebates or extra contributions would follow. Certain EU priorities could be 
excluded from the calculations, such as targeted cohesion payments or investment in some types 
of added-value. 
It would be a transparent and accountable reform contingent on further institutionalising the net 
balance approach and assuming that the effect of all types of expenditure is equal apart from those 
excluded from the calculations. A presumed advantage is that it would free Member States from 
opposing new expenditure since they would no longer fear for their net balances, which would be 
guaranteed. There are several problems with this type of correction. As mentioned above, it assumes 
that all types of expenditure are of equal value regardless of their differing investment potentials or 
the non-financial benefits that may accrue, for example in medical research. Choosing to exclude 
some types of expenditure from the calculation of the generalised correction mechanism could also 
be unfair as added-value expenditure still benefits those who are employed because of the 
allocation of such contracts. 
Instead, a solution to the dead hand of net balances is to confront the issue, and show its flaws. The 
use of net balances disregards the cross-border and long-term impact of EU policies, i.e. the benefits 
of economic integration, whose value is hard to estimate (Benedetto, 2012; Cipriani, 2014, Haug et 
al. 2011). Improving the economic prospects of fellow Member States is not only a matter of 
solidarity but rather of securing stability and avoiding negative spill-overs. Taking into consideration 
the unforeseen refugee emergency of 2015-2016, energy security, and tensions in Europe’s 
neighbourhood, one may ask whether Member States can effectively ensure national security only 
through their own activities. 
It should also be noted that expecting a net budgetary return from membership of international 
organizations is not the norm. It is usual to decide policies and then to finance them. Instead, for the 
EU the reverse is true. A rigid ceiling applies, with a legally binding commitment to disburse pre-
allocated funds in agriculture and cohesion. The effect of investment in scientific research can be 
very different if advances in knowledge have knock-on effects besides the purely economic. To treat 
all EU expenditure as if its effects or value were equal is therefore flawed. 
Meanwhile the budget’s relevance has diminished. It is rigid and prone to veto (Benedetto 2013) 
due to net balance considerations. Sapir (2003) described it as an historic relic, with embedded 
obligations to finance agriculture (a consideration of the 1960s customs union) and cohesion (a 
consideration of the 1980s single market programme and enlargement to southern Europe). It has 
not adapted to meet public expectations, and is constrained at 1% of GNI for political reasons – 
richer Member States do not accept growth in the budget. The EU has therefore innovated and 
created funds outside the budget. For example, the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), 
worth up to €500bn, and its successor InvestEU worth up to €650bn, are backed by a guarantee from 
the EU budget, but generate private and public sector lending to invest in the economy, including 
in areas of innovation.  
Where the budget has changed with the reduction in expenditure for agriculture and cohesion (still 
two-thirds of the budget between them), investment in “competitiveness” has grown from 9.2% of 
commitments in the previous MFF (2007-2013) to 13.1% in the 2014-2020 MFF. This is due to grow 
in the post-2020 MFF but to be divided between clusters 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 9 (Table A). Unlike 
agriculture and cohesion, investment in competitiveness is centrally managed, and non-pre-
allocated. Unlike agriculture, it also requires co-funding at the local level. In other words, its share of 
the budget has gradually increased, it is not directly linked to economic redistribution, and it 
operates under different rules from the traditional policies. 
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Funds and instruments outside the budget  
Table B shows that for the years 2014-2019, the latest estimates for the size of the EU budget are 
€926.8bn. During the same period, Member State contributions to EU or Europe-wide funds 
associated with the budget or outside it amounted to €334.2bn. These comprised Member State 
payments towards EFSI projects, EU Trust Funds in third countries, EU structural and investment 
funds and the Globalization Adjustment Fund. They also included payments from the Member 
States to the European Development Fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the capital 
base of the European Investment Bank, and the European Investment Fund. Concerning the ESM 
the amount reported is not loans but the capital paid-in by the Treasuries of the euro area countries. 
Table B: Paid additional contributions from Member States to EU operations (€mn), 2014-20192 
Budget Related Instruments 
 
EFSI 19.064,20 
Trust Funds and Investment Facilities 2.717,47 
ESIF 184.428,30 
EGF 104,60 
Non-Budget Related Instruments 
EDF 25.349,76 
ESM 80.483,00 
EIB Capital 21.699,13 
EIF 387,00 
Paid MS contributions in addition to the EU Budget 334.233,39 
EU Budget (2014-2019) 926.783,33 
EU operations (EU Budget + MS contributions) 1.261.016,72 
EU operations (EU Budget + MS contributions) as % of EU GNI 1,38% 
Table B reported contributions made directly by Member States through public spending to 
programmes, for example through co-funding. Table C reports the funds leveraged from partners 
by EU programmes. They amounted to €480.8bn. Putting these together with the EU budget and 
the Member State contributions already reported in Table B, takes us to a de-facto budget not of 1% 
of GNI but of 1.88%.  
Table C: Funds leveraged by EU programmes (€mn), 2014-2019 
Leveraged funding 
 
EFSI 424.000,00 
Trust Funds and Investment/Blending Facilities 23.505,20 
Horizon 2020 10.000,80 
COSME 22.800,00 
EaSI 152,30 
Creative Europe 350,00 
Total funds leveraged by EU programmes 480.808,29 
Other MS contributions (as of Table B) 334.233,39 
EU Budget (2014-2019) 926.783,30 
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EU operations (EU Budget + MS contributions + leveraged funding)  1.722.656,20 
EU Operation as % of EU GNI 1,88% 
 
Table D: Breakdown of different EU operations as percentage of EU GNI, 2014-2019 
 EUR Million % EU GNI 
EU GNI  91.420.500,00 - 
EU Budget 926.783,30 1,01% 
EU operations  
(EU Budget + MS contributions) 1.261.016,70 1,38% 
EU operations  
(EU Budget + MS contributions + leveraged funding) 1.722.656,20 1,88% 
EU operations in times of crisis 
(EU Budget + MS contributions + leveraged funding + ESM full capacity)  2.427.454,90 2,66% 
Table D reports the size of total operations as reaching a maximum of 2.66% GNI in times of crisis if 
the full capacity of the ESM were used. 
The significance of the data in Tables B, C, and D is to show that the total size of financial flows at EU 
level (or euro area level) can amount to more than double the size of the EU budget itself. 
Admittedly, part of the leverage from EFSI and the full capacity of the ESM would be based on loans, 
though these are guaranteed by public money. Whereas disputes on net balances in the EU budget 
focus on the 1% of GNI that is the EU’s de-jure budget, they overlook the full value of financial flows 
at European level.  
A package deal for agreeing a new budget 
For Lindner (2006: 171-2), package deals on the EU budget are easier when a previous package has 
started to break down. This was how an important reform to the budget was achieved in 1988 to 
replace that of 1970. By 1988, the original “Six” that had negotiated the 1970 agreement had seen 
their negotiating power reduced through three enlargements, the European Commission linked 
reform to different subfields in the budget like the internal market and growth in cohesion, the 
status quo was becoming more costly, and there was an inability to accommodate pressure for 
reform through only small changes. When the EP faces a unanimous Council whose internal 
divisions almost undermine unanimity, it has an opportunity.  
During 2013, when the 2014-2020 MFF was negotiated, the EP’s push for budgetary flexibility, a 
legally-constrained review of the budget, and a legally-enforceable investigation into new forms of 
revenue reflected the EP’s preferences and won support from the Commission and some national 
governments. The result was the creation of new institutions [rules] for governing the new flexibility, 
review and revenue systems in the budget (Benedetto 2019). 
Once the Council reaches internal agreement on the MFF, the EP can try to extract its price for 
approval. It can do this when the Council or its member governments are anxious to pass budgets 
or legislation quickly (Kardasheva 2013: 870). It is not just net receivers that want the money, the 
payers also want certainty and to have an agreement before anything is picked apart. 
A reform to the budget that is an ambitious package will have to address both Own Resources (the 
revenue) and expenditure. The Commission’s proposal of 2018 focused on three possible new Own 
Resources: levies on non-recycled plastic packaging, the Emissions Trading System, and on a 
Corporations Income Tax. The latter seems not to have been accepted in the Council. Other 
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proposals remain part of the debate including other carbon taxes, a single market levy, and a 
financial transactions tax. These would in part fill the gap in the budget’s financing opened by Brexit. 
They stand the best chance of acceptance if they can fill an added-value criterion, contributing to 
an EU policy as Pigovian or steering taxes (Pigou 2013[1920]). Pigovian taxes could discourage 
carbon use or risky financial transactions in a way consistent with EU policy. That the EU might be 
the best authority to raise such revenue (and to use it) is a secondary consideration.  
The next tables illustrate different types of package deal on the financing side, based on the package 
deal methodology presented by Núñez Ferrer et al. (2016). Accepting them may make it easier to 
achieve a more flexible, agile budget. The tables assume that there are five Member States (A to E) 
and that each of them is of equal economic size, contributing 20% each to a pre-existing GNI-based 
Own Resource. Table E illustrates a non-controversial package deal involving a new Own Resource. 
State E contributes the largest amount of revenue from the new resource, but each country is 
guaranteed that its contribution will not exceed a value of 20. This could have a Pigovian effect on 
the newly taxed sector in State E, but State E would pay no more in total than beforehand. 
Table E: Non-controversial package deal 
 State A State B State C State D State E 
Original GNI contribution 20 20 20 20 20 
New Own Resource 6 10 8 4 12 
Residual GNI Resource 14 10 12 16 8 
Total contribution 20 20 20 20 20 
In the case of Table F, State E finds the new tax unacceptable and negotiates an opt-out. The new 
tax can still be a real Own Resource in States A to D with Pigovian effects. State E pays the full 
contribution via GNI only.  
Table F: Package deal with opt-out 
 State A State B State C State D State E 
Original GNI contribution 20 20 20 20 20 
New Own Resource 6 10 8 4 - 
Residual GNI Resource 14 10 12 16 20 
Total contribution 20 20 20 20 20 
In the case of Table G, the only way to reach agreement on a new budget with new expenditure and 
new forms of revenue is to create a parallel budget outside the core budget. State E finds either the 
new revenue or expenditure to be unacceptable and does not take part. The new tax is raised in 
States A to D at different rates and may have Pigovian effects. It is then spent separately from the 
core budget only in the participating states. Blankart and Koester (2012) designed a similar system 
and suggested that such a parallel budget should be designed with a renewable sunset clause, 
reassuring participants that their commitment would not be locked-in, unless they wished to renew 
the programmes in due course. The danger with this package is that it threatens the unity of the 
budget. This would mean Member States may later question the legitimacy of other parts of the 
budget, which would risk being moved into funds and instruments outside the budget. 
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Table G: Parallel budget 
 State A State B State C State D State E 
Original GNI contribution 20 20 20 20 20 
Core budget 20 20 20 20 20 
Parallel resource 6 10 8 4 - 
Parallel budget 7 7 7 7 - 
Inspired by Blankart and Koester (2012) 
The package deal in Table H is one where a new Own Resource excessively penalises State E, which 
takes part. In this case, a rebate of minus 5 on the gross contribution would be appropriate, 
regardless of levels of expenditure in State E. If the new tax is Pigovian, the rebate would need to be 
conditional on not cross-subsidising the affected policy area. The rebate would also need to be large 
enough to incentivise the participation of State E in the new resource, so it could be more than 5. 
Rather than name it a rebate, it could be a version of the recently-proposed Just Transition Fund, 
and take the form of supplementary EU expenditure. 
Table H: Package deal with new rebate 
 State A State B State C State D State E 
Original GNI contribution 20 20 20 20 20 
New Own Resource 6 10 8 4 25 
Residual GNI Resource 14 10 12 16 -5 
Total contribution 20 20 20 20 20 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The current EU budget structure is unfit to respond to policy priorities and developments. The 
rigidity of the budget is in part related to the fact that Member States approach MFF negotiations 
with a net balance logic that fails to address three recent, major trends: 
1 Growth in the use of non-pre-allocated funds, whose beneficiaries it is impossible to 
know in advance. 
2 Growth in the use of financial instruments that mobilise additional investment 
volumes outside the budget.  
3 Increasing fragmentation and complexity that make the accurate computation of 
net balances impossible.  
MFF negotiations should shift focus towards the gross expenditures of the EU budget (Benedetto 
2017: 626). 
Escape from net balances will remove the need to create ad hoc funds to overcome the lack of 
flexibility within the budget as the structure of the budget would become clearer and more 
responsive. 
A package deal to escape net balances needs to find non-state based taxes or levies that do not 
penalise those least able to pay. Richer, and more budget-sceptical Member States should specify 
their priorities for investment at the EU level along with a strategy for persuading the less 
prosperous to accept them. At the same time, a strategy that results in providing goods like energy 
security and digital networks could be more acceptable to those economic sectors that will 
contribute more through new Own Resources, while offering continued benefits to the less 
prosperous. 
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The EU’s budget lacks the agility to respond rapidly to new challenges because of net balances. The 
creation of a more responsive budget will require an ambitious package deal that addresses the 
expenditure and revenue sides of the budget, while satisfying all of the governments around the table. 
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ENDNOTES
1 In 1999, commitments for the 2000-2006 MFF were set at 1.08% GNI, in 2006 they were set at 1.05% for the 2007-2013 
MFF, and in 2013 they were set at 1.00% GNI for the 2014-2020 MFF. 
2  I am grateful to Marta Pilati for supplying the data for Tables B, C and D. 
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